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Abstract
We provide a model where hospitals compete on quality under a xed price regime to inves-
tigate (i) whether hospital competition, as measured by an increase in xed prices or increased
patient choice, increases or reduces the gap in quality between high- and low-quality hospitals,
and as a result, (ii) whether competition increases or reduces (pure) health inequalities across
hospitals and patient severities. The answer to the rst question is generally ambiguous, but
we nd that the scope for competition to result in quality convergence across hospitals is larger
when the marginal patient health gains from quality decrease at a faster rate. Whether com-
petition increases health inequalities depends on the type and measure of inequality. If the
patient health benet function is not too concave in quality, health inequalities due to postcode
lottery will increase (decrease) whenever competition induces quality dispersion (convergence).
Competition reduces health inequalities between high- and low-severity patients if patient com-
position e¤ects, due to high-severity patients being more likely to exercise choice, are small. We
also investigate the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities as measured by the Gini and
the Generalised Gini coe¢ cients, and highlight di¤erences compared to the simpler dispersion
measures.
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1 Introduction
Recent and ongoing reforms in several OECD countries aim at stimulating competition and patient
choice among publicly-funded hospitals in order to improve quality of care (EXPH, 2015; OECD,
2012). In the U.S. Medicare and Medicaid programmes, hospitals are paid by Diagnosis Related
Group (DRG) since 1983. Medicare and Medicaid cover respectively individuals older than 65 years
old and poor patients. The DRG system involves paying a xed tari¤ for every patient treated.
In the United Kingdom, under a policy commonly known as Payment by Results, hospitals are
also paid a tari¤ for every patient treated, and patients are free to choose the hospital. Hospital
competition is also present in other countries such as Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Norway.
The idea is that hospitals competeon quality to attract patients and are rewarded nancially for
doing so.
Opponents of hospital competition argue that these policies will harm equity. For example, high-
quality hospitals will respond to competition by improving even more, while low-quality hospitals
will be left behind. A recent report by the European Commission highlights that despite the
extensive literature investigating the e¤ect of competition in the health sector, there is very limited
literature focusing on its equity implications (EXPH, 2015). Reduction in health inequalities are
an ubiquitous policy objective, and it is surprising that it has received little attention in relation
to competition. We contribute to ll this gap in knowledge.
In this study we extend the received theoretical literature by investigating (i) whether com-
petition increases or reduces the gap in quality between high- and low-quality hospitals, and (ii)
whether, as a result, competition increases or reduces health inequalities. We focus on two di-
mensions of (pure) health inequalities (Wagsta¤ and van Dooerslaer, 2000, section 5). The rst
type of health inequalities is what is commonly known, in the hospital context, as inequalities due
to postcode lottery: a patient living close to a given hospital might receive much poorer quality
compared to a patient living close to a good hospital (Dalton, 2014, p.4). The second type of health
inequalities relates to disparities in health across patients with di¤erent severity: if high-severity
patients benet less from competition than low-severity patients, health inequalities will worsen.
The equity concern across severity groups is regularly reected in sub-group analysis (by severity
type) in cost-e¤ectiveness analysis (Sculpher and Gafni, 2001). Given that we have two sources of
health inequalities, we also investigate how competition a¤ects the Gini coe¢ cient, a commonly
used measure to empirically assess health inequalities within or across countries (Wagsta¤ and van
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Dooerslaer, 2000).
Our choice of theoretical framework is a Hotelling model with two hospitals competing on
quality and located at the extremes of a unit line. In this respect we follow the existing theoretical
literature, where quality competition is typically analysed within a spatial competition framework.
We allow one hospital to have a comparative advantage so that hospitals provide di¤erent qualities
in equilibrium. We focus on two measures of competition: (i) an increase in the xed price, and
(ii) a reduction in transportation costs. A higher price increases the protability of attracting more
patients, and therefore stimulates the hospitals to compete on quality. A reduction in transportation
costs can be interpreted as an increase in patient choice, where patients are encouraged to choose
hospitals based on quality and therefore stimulates competition. Patient choice can be enhanced by
the introduction or the enhancement of public reporting of quality indicators (Siciliani, Chalkley
and Gravelle, 2017).
Our key ndings are as follows. Whether competition increases or reduces quality di¤erences
across hospitals is generally ambiguous, and depends on two key factors related to the demand for
health care and the cost of health care provision, namely (i) the marginal health gains from quality
and (ii) the extent to which quality a¤ects marginal treatment costs. The answer also depends,
to some extent, on how we measure competition, whether by an increase in the xed price or by
an increase in the degree of patient choice. Our most clear-cut result is that quality convergence
across hospitals is a more likely e¤ect of increased competition, regardless of how it is measured, if
marginal health gains decrease with quality at a faster rate.
Whether competition increases health inequalities depends on the type of inequality and the
e¤ect does not necessarily have the same sign as the change in hospital quality di¤erences. If
health gains are linear or not too concave in quality, health inequalities due to postcode lottery go
hand in hand with health inequalities: they will increase (decrease) whenever competition induces
quality dispersion (convergence). But if health gains are concave in quality to a su¢ cient degree,
then health inequalities can reduce even if competition induces quality dispersion, and they will
always reduce if competition induces quality convergence. Competition generally reduces health
inequalities between high- and low-severity patients, because high-severity patients benet more
from higher quality than do low-severity patients. However, this reduction can be strengthened
or weakened by what we refer to as composition e¤ects, which relate to competition inducing
high-severity patients to exercise choice more than low-severity patients by selecting hospitals with
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higher quality.
We then derive the e¤ect of competition on aggregate measures of absolute and relative in-
equality, namely the Generalised Gini and Gini coe¢ cients, respectively. These measures are con-
ceptually distinct from the above-mentioned measures of dispersion across hospitals and severity
groups. Consider for example the case with just one severity group. Even if competition increases
di¤erences in health outcomes across hospitals (an increase in inequalities due to postcode lottery),
the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient may still reduce if competition induces more patients to go to the
high-quality hospital. Similarly, if competition has no e¤ect on di¤erences on health outcomes, the
Gini coe¢ cient will still reduce as a result of the overall increase in quality. With two severity
groups, numerical simulations based on two di¤erent parameterisations of the model suggest that
competition (whether measured by price or patient choice) tends to reduce both absolute and rela-
tive inequality when the shares of high- and low-severity patients are not too di¤erent. One of the
main driving forces is that competition tends to reduce inequalities between high- and low-severity
patients, regardless of how competition is measured and regardless of whether competition leads
to quality dispersion or quality convergence.
In line with the existing literature, our theoretical model assumes that hospitals are prot
maximisers and suggests that an increase in competition increases quality (Ma and Burgess, 1993;
Wolinsky, 1997; Gravelle, 1999; Beitia, 2003; Nuscheler, 2003; Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume,
2006, 2007; Gaynor, 2006; Karlsson, 2007). This result also holds with altruistic providers but
only if the degree of altruism is not too high (Brekke, Siciliani and Straume, 2011, 2012; see also
Barigozzi and Burani, 2016).
The seminal empirical study by Kessler and McClellan (2000) suggests that competition in-
creases quality. This result is also conrmed by Tay (2003), but only partially by Shen (2003)
while Gowrinsankaran and Town (2003) nd a negative e¤ect. The latest evidence from England
suggests that competition, as measured by the introduction of patient choice policies, increases
quality under di¤erent empirical approaches (Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2013; Bloom et al.,
2015). There is only one empirical study which directly tests the e¤ect of competition on equity.
Cookson et al. (2013) nd that competition did not harm equity, as measured by di¤erence in hip
replacement utilisation across socioeconomic status in England. This study is not directly relevant
for us given the focus on utilisation as opposed to quality and health outcomes, and the focus on
socioeconomic inequalities as opposed to pure health inequalities. Although not focussing on equity,
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Kessler and Geppert (2005) nd that competition improved health for high-severity patients but
not for low-severity patients, therefore providing indirect evidence that health inequalities across
severity groups reduced. Some empirical studies (Dafny, 2005; Farrar et al., 2009) also test the
e¤ect of price changes on quality, but none of them focuses on equity implications. Our approach is
positive rather than normative. Although we could derive the optimal pricing rule set by a welfare
maximising regulator, in reality hospital prices are xed and are set to reect average treatment
costs. We therefore prefer to investigate how competition a¤ects health inequalities under current
common nancial arrangements.
The study is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and derive equilibrium
quality. In Section 3, we investigate how competition a¤ects quality di¤erences across hospitals,
and in Section 4, how competition a¤ects health inequalities. Section 5 draws implications for
empirical analyses. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Model
Consider a market for a healthcare treatment (e.g., a coronary bypass or a hip replacement) o¤ered
by two di¤erent providers (hospitals), located at opposite endpoints of a Hotelling line of length
1. Demand comes from a unit mass of patients who are uniformly distributed on the line. At each
point of the line there is a share  of high-severity patients, denoted by h. The remaining patients
have lower severity and are denoted by l. A patient of type k who is treated at Hospital i has the
following utility:
Uki (qi) = B
k (qi)  td, k = h; l; i = 1; 2, (1)
where Bk () is the (expected) health status of a patient with severity k following healthcare treat-
ment; qi  q is the quality of treatment at Hospital i; d is the distance travelled by the patient,
and t is the marginal cost of travelling. The lower bound q on quality represents the minimum
treatment quality that the hospitals are allowed to o¤er, and we can interpret the case of qi < q
as malpractice. We assume that: (i) for a given level of treatment quality, the patient with higher
severity is in worse health, even after treatment, Bh (q) < Bl (q); and (ii) the patient with higher
severity benets more from a marginal increase in treatment quality, i.e. @Bh=@q > @Bl=@q > 0
for all q. Thus, for a given level of treatment quality, the di¤erence in health status across high-
and low-severity patients is smaller the higher the quality of treatment.
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Under the assumption of unit demand and full market coverage, utility-maximising behaviour
leads to the following demand functions for high- and low-severity patients, respectively, at Hospital
i:
Dhi := 

1
2
+
Bh (qi) Bh (qj)
2t

; (2)
Dli := (1  )

1
2
+
Bl (qi) Bl (qj)
2t

; (3)
where i = 1; 2, j = 1; 2, and i 6= j. Total demand for Hospital i is then
Di = D
h
i +D
l
i; (4)
while total demand for Hospital j is Dj = 1 Di.
Each hospital is assumed to maximise prots. Under the assumption that the (regulated) price
p is the same for both types of patients (e.g., DRG tari¤ for a coronary bypass), prots of Hospital
i are given by
i =

p  chi (qi)

Dhi +

p  cli(qi)

Dli   C(qi); (5)
where cki (qi) is the marginal cost of treating a patient with severity k, and C(qi) is the xed cost of
quality (e.g., MRI machines). We assume that the xed cost of quality increases with quality at an
increasing rate, @C=@qi > 0 and @2C=@q2i > 0, that the marginal treatment cost increases (weakly)
with quality, @cki (qi) =@qi  0, and that the cost of treating a high-severity patient is higher than
the cost of treating a low-severity patient, chi (qi) > c
l
i (qi) for all qi. We also assume that hospitals
di¤er in marginal treatment costs, with Hospital 1 having a cost advantage: ck1 (q1) < c
k
2 (q2) and
@ck1 (q1) =@q1  @ck2 (q2) =@q2 for q1 = q2.
The hospitals simultaneously choose qualities in a non-cooperative one-shot game. We consider
an interior-solution Nash equilibrium in which both hospitals choose treatment quality above the
minimum level. This Nash equilibrium is implicitly characterised by a pair of rst-order conditions,
given by1
@i
@qi
=
X
k

p  cki (qi )
 @Dki qi ; qj
@qi
 
X
k
@cki (q

i )
@qi
Dki
 
qi ; q

j
  @C (qi )
@qi
= 0; (6)
1Second-order and stability conditions are given in the Appendix.
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where
@Dhi
@qi
=

2t
@Bh
@qi
;
@Dli
@qi
=
1  
2t
@Bl
@qi
: (7)
Given our assumptions on the hospitalscost functions, the Nash equilibrium is asymmetric and
the hospital with a cost advantage provides a higher quality, q1 > q2.
3 Competition and quality di¤erences
What is the e¤ect of competition on quality provision? In particular, does ercer competition
reduce or amplify quality dispersion between the hospitals? Our modelling framework allows us to
consider two di¤erent policy measures that stimulate competition: (i) more high-powered nancial
incentives in the form of a higher treatment price, p, and (ii) increased patient choice, which is
captured by a reduction in the transportation cost parameter, t. For ease of exposition, we refer
to the degree of patient choice (i.e., a positive measure of competition, as for an increase in price)
as r :=  t. Higher r could for example be due to policies which implement public reporting of
quality measures in the public domain. The former policy makes it more protable to attract
patients, whereas the latter policy makes demand more responsive to quality changes. In both
cases, incentives for competition are intensied.
3.1 Higher treatment price p
It is possible to show (see Appendix) that a higher price leads to higher quality for both hospitals
in equilibrium: @qi =@p > 0, i = 1; 2. The main e¤ect is that a higher price increases the price-cost
margin and therefore makes it more protable for each hospital to attract more patients by providing
higher quality. If the marginal treatment costs increase with quality (i.e., if @cki (qi) =@qi > 0), this
e¤ect will be reinforced by competition due to qualities being strategic complements.2
These e¤ects are well known from previous literature. In this study we are interested in inves-
tigating whether the price increase amplies or reduces equilibrium quality di¤erences, dened by
 := q1   q2. Using (A5)-(A6) in the Appendix, this e¤ect is given by
@
@p
=
1
H

@D2
@q2

@21
@q21
+
@21
@q2@q1

  @D1
@q1

@22
@q22
+
@22
@q1@q2

; (8)
2 If marginal treatment costs depend positively on quality, higher quality by Hospital i will reduce the marginal
cost of quality provision for Hospital j through lower demand. As a result, Hospital j will respond by increasing its
quality as well.
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where the expressions for H > 0, @2i=@qj@qi  0 and @2i=@q2i < 0 are given in the Appendix.
The sign of @=@p is generally ambiguous. It depends on the di¤erence between the demand
responsiveness to quality of Hospital 2, weighted by the sum of the degree of concavity of the
prot function of Hospital 1 and its degree of prot complementarity in qualities, and the demand
responsiveness of Hospital 1, similarly weighted.
The condition for whether a higher price leads to quality convergence or quality dispersion can
be more extensively stated as follows:
@
@p
< (>) 0 if
B2

@2C
@q21
+ c1 +  1 + p1

> (<)B1

@2C
@q22
+ c2 +  2 + p2

; (9)
where
B1 := 
@Bh
@q1
+ (1  ) @B
l
@q1
> 0; B2 := 
@Bh
@q2
+ (1  ) @B
l
@q2
> 0; (10)
p1 :=  

p  ch1
 
2t
@2Bh
@q21
+

p  cl1
 1  
2t
@2Bl
@q21

> 0; (11)
p2 :=  

p  ch2
 
2t
@2Bh
@q22
+

p  cl2
 1  
2t
@2Bl
@q22

> 0; (12)
c1 :=
@2ch1
@q21
Dh1 +
@2cl1
@ql1
Dl1 ? 0; c2 :=
@2ch2
@q22
Dh2 +
@2cl2
@ql2
Dl2 ? 0; (13)
 1 :=

2t
@ch1
@q1

2
@Bh
@q1
  @B
h
@q2

+
1  
2t
@cl1
@q1

2
@Bl
@q1
  @B
l
@q2

? 0; (14)
 2 :=

2t
@ch2
@q2

2
@Bh
@q2
  @B
h
@q1

+
1  
2t
@cl2
@q2

2
@Bl
@q2
  @B
l
@q1

> 0: (15)
We can interpret Bi as the expected marginal health gain from quality in Hospital i across both
severity types; ci as the degree of convexity of marginal treatment costs with respect to quality in
Hospital i, and pi as Hospital is prot margin, weighted by the degree of concavity of the demand
function.
Under the condition of equilibrium stability, both sides of the inequality in (9) are positive.
Since by assumption Hospital 1 provides a higher quality, the marginal health gain from quality, and
therefore demand responsiveness, is (weakly) higher in Hospital 2 relative to Hospital 1, B2  B1
(with a strict inequality if Bk () is strictly concave). In turn, this tends to give a stronger incentive
for Hospital 2 to increase quality, relative to Hospital 1, therefore reducing dispersion in qualities
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across hospitals.
However, changes in quality also a¤ect the marginal protability of quality (i.e., the degree of
concavity of the prot function) and the degree of complementarity in qualities across hospitals,
which are captured by the terms in brackets in (8). For example, if the marginal protability of
quality is higher for Hospital 1 as a result of the price and quality increases, then Hospital 1 may
increase quality more than Hospital 2. In order to further characterise the other relevant terms, we
introduce some additional assumptions:
A1 The weighted prot margin is higher for the provider with a competitive advantage, p1  p2.
A2 The xed-quality-cost function C () is quadratic.
A3 The marginal treatment cost, cki (qi), is linear in quality.
A1 holds if the equilibrium prot margin of the high-quality hospital is su¢ ciently large relative
to the low-quality hospital. If @3Bk=@q3i  0, A1 holds as long as the marginal treatment cost
advantage of Hospital 1 is not overturned in equilibrium (i.e., ck1 (q

1)  ck1 (q2)). Furthermore,
A2 essentially rules out the possibility that the sign of (9) is determined by potential mechanisms
related to the sign of the third-order derivative of the xed-quality-cost function. Finally, A3
ensures that the degree of convexity of marginal treatment costs with respect to quality is the same
across the two hospitals, which implies c1 = c2 = 0 and  1   2. After deriving results that hold
under A1-A3, we will briey discuss the implications of relaxing A2.
Applying A1-A3, the condition in (9) reduces to
@
@p
< (>) 0 if
B2
B1
> (<)
k +  2 + p2
k +  1 + p1
; (16)
where k := @2C=@q21 = @
2C=@q22. The general ambiguity remains, but we can now more precisely
characterise each of the two possibilities by identifying the following set of su¢ cient conditions:3
Proposition 1 Given assumptions A1-A3:
(i) If the marginal health gain from quality is strictly decreasing, @2Bk=@q2i < 0, and if the e¤ect
of quality on marginal treatment costs, @cki =@qi, is su¢ ciently small, a higher price leads to quality
convergence in equilibrium, @=@p < 0.
3Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are given in the in Appendix.
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(ii) If the marginal health gain from quality is constant or decreases slowly with quality, and if the
high-quality hospital has a cost advantage in the provision of quality in equilibrium, @ck1(q

1)=@q1 <
@ck2(q

2)=@q2, a higher price leads to quality dispersion in equilibrium, @=@p > 0.
(iii) If the marginal health gain from quality is constant, and if marginal treatment costs are
constant, @cki =@qi = 0, a higher price does not a¤ect quality di¤erences in equilibrium, @=@p = 0.
The proposition highlights the two main mechanisms at work: (i) the concavity of the health
benet function, which determines the relative magnitudes of B1 and B2, and (ii) the di¤erences
in the e¤ect of quality on marginal treatment costs, which determines the relative magnitudes of
 1 and  2.
The former mechanism contributes to quality convergence in response to a price increase. A
strictly concave health benet function implies that the marginal health benet of quality is higher
for patients in the low-quality hospital, which in turn implies that demand responds more strongly
to quality for this hospital. A price increase will therefore lead to a larger increase in the mar-
ginal revenue of quality for Hospital 2 than for Hospital 1, contributing, all else equal, to quality
convergence between the two hospitals. However, this e¤ect is counteracted by di¤erences in the
e¤ects of quality on marginal treatment costs, which relate to the degree of prot concavity and of
prot complementarity in qualities. If quality has a smaller e¤ect on marginal treatment costs in
Hospital 1, this hospital has a stronger incentive to increase quality in response to a price increase,
leading, all else equal, to higher quality dispersion between the two hospitals.
In addition to these two counteracting e¤ects, which are given by the relative magnitudes of
B2=B1 and  2= 1, respectively, there is the e¤ect of p1  p2. This e¤ect, which is also related
to di¤erences in the degree of concavity of the prot functions of the two hospitals, works in the
direction of quality convergence in response to a price increase. Thus, in broad terms, demand
e¤ects (mainly through demand responsiveness) tend to induce quality convergence, whereas cost
advantages in quality provision tend to induce quality dispersion.
Assumption A2 eliminates potential e¤ects due to the convexity of the xed costs of quality.
To highlight and isolate the role played by the xed costs of quality, suppose that health benets
are linear in quality and treatment costs are constant (but lower for Hospital 1 than for Hospital
2). This implies B1 = B2 and pi = ci =  i = 0, which means that (9) reduces to
@
@p
> (<)0 if
@2C
@q22
> (<)
@2C
@q21
: (17)
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Whether qualities diverge or converge as a result of a price increase depends on the di¤erence in
the degree of convexity of the cost function across hospitals (evaluated at equilibrium qualities).
Since q1 > q2, the condition in (17) is equivalent to
@
@p
> (<)0 if
@3C
@q3
< (>) 0:
Thus, if the degree of convexity in xed costs increases (reduces) with quality, a price increase will
induce quality convergence (dispersion).
3.2 Increased patient choice r
In a symmetric model with prot-maximising providers and regulated prices, there is a well-
established positive relationship between increased patient choice, measured as a reduction of trans-
portation costs, and equilibrium quality provision. In our asymmetric setting, lower transportation
costs have however additional e¤ects on unilateral quality provision incentives. On the one hand,
as in a symmetric model, increased patient choice makes demand more quality elastic, which gives
both hospitals an incentive to increase quality. On the other hand, for given quality levels, in-
creased patient choice implies that a larger share of each patient type chooses the high-quality
hospital. If marginal treatment costs increase with quality, @cki =@qi > 0, such a reallocation of
demand implies higher (lower) marginal cost of quality provision, and therefore weaker (stronger)
incentives for quality provision, for the high-quality (low-quality) hospital. However, by applying
the rst-order conditions, (6), it can be shown (see Appendix) that the former e¤ect dominates
the latter, implying that the results from a symmetric model also carry over to an asymmetric
one. Increased patient choice leads to higher quality provision in equilibrium for both hospitals:
@qi =@r > 0, i = 1; 2.
Whether patient choice leads to quality dispersion or quality convergence is a priori ambiguous.
Using (A10)-(A11) in the Appendix, the exact condition is given by
@
@r
> (<) 0 if
2

 1 + p1 + c1 +
@2C1
@q21

< (>) 1

 2 + p2 + c2 +
@2C2
@q22

; (18)
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where pi, ci and  i are dened by (11)-(15), and
1 :=
1
2t


@ch1
@q1
+ (1  ) @c
l
1
@q1
+ 2
@C
@q1

> 0; (19)
2 :=
1
2t


@ch2
@q2
+ (1  ) @c
l
2
@q2
+ 2
@C
@q2

> 0: (20)
Compared to the case of a higher price, the criterion for quality convergence or dispersion as a
result of lower transportation costs depends somewhat less on the concavity of the health benet
function and somewhat more on the characteristics of the treatment cost function, in particular
the relationship between marginal treatment costs and quality. Once more applying A1-A3, the
condition in (18) reduces to
@
@r
> (<) 0 if
2
1
< (>)
k +  2 + p2
k +  1 + p1
: (21)
Notice that, whereas  2   1 and p1  p2, the relative magnitudes of 1 and 2 are a priori
ambiguous. The next proposition establishes a su¢ cient condition for one of the two possible
outcomes:
Proposition 2 Given assumptions A1-A3, if the marginal health gain from quality is constant or
decreases slowly with quality, and if the e¤ect of quality on marginal treatment cost, @cki =@qi, is
su¢ ciently small, increased patient choice leads to quality dispersion in equilibrium, @=@r > 0.
To gain some intuition for this condition, notice that the right-hand sides of (16) and (21) are
equal, whereas the left-hand sides are di¤erent. Thus, whether considering a price increase or an
increase in patient choice, the e¤ects of  2   1 and p1  p2 are similar in both cases and work in
the directions of quality dispersion and quality convergence, respectively. However, the left-hand
side of (21) introduces two new e¤ects that are specic to the case of increased patient choice. Both
e¤ects are related to treatment cost advantages but work in opposite directions.
(i) Increased patient choice r implies that demand becomes more responsive to quality, which
increases the marginal revenue of quality and gives both hospitals an incentive to increase quality.
If c1 (q1) < c2 (q2), the prot margin is higher for Hospital 1, which implies that the increase in
marginal revenue of quality, due to more quality-responsive demand, is also higher for Hospital 1,
which gives this hospital a stronger incentive to increase quality. This e¤ect contributes, all else
12
equal, to quality dispersion.
(ii) The increase in demand responsiveness due increased patient choice also implies that,
for given qualities, demand is shifted towards the high-quality hospital (i.e., @D1=@r > 0 and
@D2=@r < 0). If marginal treatment costs depend on quality, the demand increase (decrease) for
the high-quality (low-quality) hospital implies that the marginal cost of quality provision increases
(decreases) for the high-quality (low-quality) hospital. All else equal, this gives the high-quality
(low-quality) hospital an incentive to reduce (increase) quality. This e¤ect works in the opposite
direction of (ii) and contributes, all else equal, to quality convergence.
The opposite natures of (i) and (ii) contribute to the general ambiguity of (21). However, if
the e¤ect of quality on marginal treatment costs is su¢ ciently small, (ii) becomes irrelevant and so
does the e¤ect related to  2   1. Furthermore, if the marginal health gain from quality decreases
at a su¢ ciently slow rate, the e¤ect related to p1  p2 also becomes irrelevant. In this case, which
is identied by Proposition 2, the only relevant e¤ect is (i). Notice that, if @cki =@qi is su¢ ciently
small, the basic assumptions of our model ensures that c1 (q1) < c2 (q2).
Again, assumption A2 eliminates potential e¤ects due to the convexity of the xed costs of
quality. In the special case of constant marginal treatment costs (c1 < c2) and linear health benet
functions, which implies  1 =  2 = p1 = p2 = 0, the condition in (21) reduces to
@
@r
> 0 if
@C
@q1
>
@C
@q2
; (22)
which, due to the strict convexity of xed costs of quality C, is always true for q1 > q2.4 Di¤erently
from an increase in competition through an increase in price, increased patient choice always induces
quality dispersion under constant marginal treatment costs and linear health benet functions,
regardless of the degree of convexity in the xed costs of quality.
3.3 Parametric examples
In order to illustrate the general results stated in Propositions 1 and 2, and to gain some additional
insights regarding the main mechanisms of the model, we proceed by exploring some parametric
examples.
4Notice that the expressions for 1 and 2 have been obtained after substitutions using the rst-order conditions
of the hospitals maximisation problems (see Appendix). Thus, the second e¤ect identied above, which relies
on di¤erences in prot margins across hospitals, is captured by the di¤erences in marginal costs of quality in the
expressions for 1 and 2.
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The previous analysis has revealed two key determinants of whether increased competition leads
to quality convergence or quality dispersion, namely (i) the degree of concavity of the health benet
function, and (ii) the degree to which quality a¤ects marginal treatment costs. In the following
two parametric examples, we will consider each of these two dimensions separately, which also
allows us to obtain closed-form solutions. In both examples, we parameterise the xed costs (of
quality) function as follows: C (qi) = (k=2)q2i . Furthermore, for simplicity we disregard patient
heterogeneity (with respect to severity) by setting  = 1. This is without loss of generality, since
the share of high-severity versus low-severity patients does not qualitatively a¤ect the relationship
between competition and quality dispersion.
Example 1 Decreasing marginal health gain from quality and constant marginal treat-
ment costs. Suppose that marginal treatment costs are constant and given by c1 < c2. We will
consider two di¤erent parameterisations of the health benet functions. (i) Suppose that B () is
quadratic and given by
B (qi) = + qi   
2
q2i :
In this case, equilibrium qualities are given by
qi =
 (p  ci)
 (p  ci) + 2kt :
The e¤ect of increased competition on quality di¤erences is given by
@
@p
=  2kt (c2   c1) ( (2p  c1   c2) + 4kt)
( (p  c1) + 2kt)2 ( (p  c2) + 2kt)2
< 0
and
@
@r
=
2k (c2   c1)
 
4k2t2   2 (p  c1) (p  c2)

( (p  c1) + 2kt)2 ( (p  c2) + 2kt)2
< (>) 0
if  > (<)
2ktp
(p  c1) (p  c2)
:
(ii) Suppose that B () is logarithmic and given by
B (qi) = +  ln qi:
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In this case equilibrium qualities are given by
qi =
p
2
2kt
p
kt (p  ci):
The e¤ect of increased competition on quality dispersion is in this case given by
@
@p
=  
p
2
p
kt (p  c1)
p
kt (p  c2)
p
kt (p  c1) 
p
kt (p  c2)

4k2t2 (p  c1) (p  c2) < 0
and
@
@r
=
p
2
p
kt (p  c1) 
p
kt (p  c2)

4kt2
> 0:
In the benchmark case of constant marginal health gains of quality and constant marginal
treatment costs, we know from Propositions 1 and 2 that a higher price has no e¤ect on quality
dispersion whereas increased patient choice lead to increased quality dispersion. Example 1 illus-
trates that this is changed by the introduction of a concave health benet function. Whether the
health benet function is quadratic or logarithmic, a higher price always leads to quality conver-
gence, which is consistent with Proposition 1. In the case of a quadratic health benet function,
increased patient choice also leads to quality convergence if the degree of concavity (measured by
the parameter ) is su¢ ciently large, which is consistent with Proposition 2. In this case, di¤erent
competition measures have the same e¤ect on the sign of quality di¤erences.
However, if the health benet function is logarithmic (or quadratic with a low degree of concav-
ity), increased patient choice always leads to quality dispersion, and di¤erent competition measures
have opposite e¤ects on hospital quality di¤erences. This is explained by the fact that p1 = p2 in
this parametric example, which implies that the only mechanism in play is the e¤ect related to the
higher prot margin of Hospital 1 (which implies 1 > 2).
Overall, Example 1 illustrates that the presence of decreasing marginal health gains of quality
increases the scope for quality convergence as a result of more competition, but also that di¤erent
competition measures can have di¤erent e¤ect on quality dispersion across hospitals. It is also
worth noticing that A1 holds for both quadratic and logarithmic health benets, even though the
logarithmic form implies @3B=@q3i  0, which suggests that this assumption is not overly restrictive.
Example 2 Constant marginal health gains of quality and quality-dependent marginal
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treatment costs. Suppose that the health benet function is given by
B (qi) = + qi;
and that marginal treatment costs are given by
c (qi) = ciqi;
where c1 < c2. In this case, equilibrium qualities are given by
qi =
2kt (p   tci) +  (p (ci + 2cj)  3tcicj)
32cicj + 4kt ( (ci + cj) + kt)
:
The e¤ect of increased competition on quality dispersion is given by
@
@p
=
(c2   c1)2
32c1c2 + 4kt ( (c1 + c2) + kt)
> 0
and
@
@r
=
4k (c2   c1) (p ( (c1 + c2) + 2kt)  t (2kt (c1 + c2) + 3c1c2)) 
32c1c2 + 4kt ( (c1 + c2) + kt)
2 > (<) 0
if p > (<)
t (2kt (c1 + c2) + 3c1c2)
 ( (c1 + c2) + 2kt)
:
Consistent with Proposition 1, the combination of constant marginal health gains and quality-
dependent marginal treatment costs imply that a higher price leads to quality dispersion. Increased
patient choice yields the same outcome if the price is su¢ ciently high relative to marginal treatment
costs. Thus, even if marginal treatment costs are strongly a¤ected by quality (i.e., ci is large),
increased patient choice will nevertheless lead to higher quality dispersion if the price is su¢ ciently
large. In this case, the dominating mechanism is the one that is caused by the prot margin being
higher for the high-quality hospital, as explained in Section 3.3.
The main insights from the above examples are summarised in Table 1. The most clear-cut
conclusion that can be drawn is that the scope for increased competition to instigate quality con-
vergence increases with the concavity of the health benet function. This applies in particular to
the case of increased competition induced by price increases. However, there is still a relatively
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wide range of parameter congurations for which price increases and increased patient choice have
opposite e¤ects on quality di¤erences.
Table 1. The e¤ects of competition on quality di¤erences
Health gain Marginal costs Increase in price Increase in patient choice
Linear Constant No e¤ect Dispersion
Linear Linear in quality Dispersion Dispersion (convergence) if price is high (low)
Logarithmic Constant Convergence Dispersion
Quadratic Constant Convergence Convergence (dispersion) if  is high (low)*
*The parameter  denotes the degree of concavity of the health benet function.
4 Competition and health inequalities
In the previous section we have characterised the conditions under which competition induces a
reduction or an increase in inequalities in the level of quality across hospitals, which we have referred
to as quality convergence and quality dispersion, respectively.
In this section we investigate how competition a¤ects health inequalities. In our model we
have four groups of patients who di¤er in severity and the provider from which they receive the
treatment, and we answer this question in three steps. First, we look at inequalities in health
outcomes across hospitals. These can be thought of as inequalities arising from the postcode
lottery: some patients will have worse health outcomes than others simply because they live closer
to a low-quality hospital. Second, we look at inequalities in health outcomes between patients with
high and low severity, and check whether competition increases or reduces the health gap between
the two patient groups. Third, we look at aggregate measures of (relative and absolute) health
inequality based on the Gini and Generalised Gini coe¢ cients since these have been commonly
used in the health economics empirical literature to measure health inequalities.
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4.1 Absolute health inequalities across hospitals (postcode lottery)
When considering health inequalities across hospitals, we restrict attention to inequalities within
each patient type. As long as health outcomes (e.g., mortality rates) are risk adjusted, the analysis
would be similar in the presence of patients with di¤erent severity. For a given level of severity, the
di¤erence in health outcomes of patients being treated at Hospital 1 and 2, respectively, is given
by

k := Bk (q1) Bk (q2) ; k = h; l, with 
h > 
l: (23)
The e¤ect of competition on health inequalities is consequently given by
@
k
@p
=
@Bk
@q1
@q1
@p
  @B
k
@q2
@q2
@p
; (24)
@
k
@r
=
@Bk
@q1
@q1
@r
  @B
k
@q2
@q2
@r
: (25)
If competition induces quality convergence, i.e., if it reduces inequalities in quality across hospitals
in addition to raising quality in both hospitals, then competition also reduces health inequalities. If
the marginal health gain from quality is constant, inequalities are driven by di¤erences in quality.
This e¤ect is reinforced if the marginal health gain from quality is decreasing and therefore smaller
in the hospital with higher quality. Reductions in inequalities in quality always reduce health
inequalities.
If competition induces quality dispersion, i.e., if it increases inequalities in quality across hos-
pitals, then the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities is instead ambiguous. It is only when
the health gain from quality is linear or not too concave that inequalities in levels of quality go
hand-in-hand with health inequalities, so that quality dispersion increases health inequalities. If
the marginal health gain from quality is decreasing, the larger quality increase in Hospital 1 arising
from competition can be dampened or even o¤set by the smaller marginal health gain of quality,
and quality dispersion can therefore reduce health inequalities.
Proposition 3 (i) If competition induces quality convergence, then it reduces health inequalities
across hospitals for each severity type. (ii) If competition induces quality dispersion, it increases
health inequalities when the health gain from quality is not too concave in quality; it reduces health
inequalities when the health gain from quality is su¢ ciently concave. (iii) If competition has no
e¤ect on quality di¤erences across hospitals, it reduces health inequalities if the health gain from
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quality is concave.
The second part of the Proposition 3 can be illustrated by considering the parameterisations
used in Example 1 of the previous section. For both types of health benet functions (quadratic
and logarithmic), a higher price leads to quality convergence and therefore (by Proposition 3) to
reduced health inequality between patients within each severity type. On the other hand, the e¤ect
of increased patient choice on health inequalities is a priori ambiguous. With a quadratic health
benet function, the e¤ect is given by
@

@r
=
4k2t2 (c2   c1)

8k3t3   2 (p  c2) (p  c1) ( (2p  c1   c2) + 6kt)

( (p  c1) + 2kt)3 ( (p  c2) + 2kt)3
:
It is relatively straightforward to see that the sign of this expression is positive (negative) if 
is su¢ ciently low (high). There are two di¤erent forces at play here, both of which work in the
same direction. A higher value of  (which implies a more concave benet function), increases the
scope for increased patient choice leading to less inequality even if di¤erences in quality increase.
In addition, a more concave benet function also increases the scope for quality convergence as a
result of increased patient choice, as shown by Example 1.
Consider an illustrative numerical example, with p = k = t = 2,  = c2 = 1 and c1 = 0:5, which
yields the following e¤ects of increased patient choice on quality dispersion and health inequality:
(i)  < 3:26 : @@r > 0 and
@

@r > 0:
(ii) 3:26 <  < 6:53 : @@r > 0 and
@

@r < 0:
(iii)  > 6:53 : @@r < 0 and
@

@r < 0:
The interesting case is (ii). When the degree of concavity is in an intermediate range, increased
patient choice leads to quality dispersion but simultaneously reduces health inequalities within each
severity group, because marginal health gains from quality is decreasing at a su¢ ciently high rate.
Using instead the logarithmic health benet function in Example 1, it is straightforward to
show that @
=@r = 0. In this case, and regardless of the degree of concavity of the health benet
function, the increase in quality di¤erence across hospitals due to increased patient choice is exactly
o¤set by the counteracting e¤ect of decreasing marginal health gains, leaving health inequalities
una¤ected.
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4.2 Absolute health inequalities between high- and low-severity patients
In this sub-section we investigate how competition a¤ects health inequalities across patient severity.
These could be due to patients di¤ering in severity within the same condition or across conditions.
For example, for patients who had a heart attack (within the same health condition), high severity
patients have a history of heart conditions or other comorbidities. Across conditions, we could
think of high-severity patients as patients with cancer as opposed to patients in need of a cataract
surgery (low-severity patients).5
The average (or expected) health outcome for a high-severity patient is given by
B
h
=
1


Dh1B
h (q1) +

 Dh1

Bh (q2)

; (26)
which can be re-written as
B
h
=
Bh (q1) +Bh (q2)
2
+
 
Bh (q1) Bh (q2)
2
2t
: (27)
The similar expression for a low-severity patient is
B
l
=
Bl (q1) +Bl (q2)
2
+
 
Bl (q1) Bl (q2)
2
2t
: (28)
Health inequalities between patient types can then be dened as  := B
l  Bh.
Higher treatment price The e¤ect of a price increase can be expressed as
@
@p
=  1
2
2X
i=1

@Bh
@qi
  @B
l
@qi

@qi
@p
  1
t

Bh (q1) Bh (q2)
@Bh
@q1
@q1
@p
  @B
h
@q2
@q2
@p

+
1
t

Bl (q1) Bl (q2)
@Bl
@q1
@q1
@p
  @B
l
@q2
@q2
@p

: (29)
The rst term is the e¤ect on health inequality for given patient allocations. A higher price leads to
higher quality provision at both hospitals. Since the health gain of higher quality is larger for high-
severity than for low-severity patients, the inequality in health outcomes between the two patient
groups is reduced. Therefore, the rst e¤ect is unambiguously negative, and this is regardless of
5Although our model has only one price, and therefore implicitly considers only one condition, the e¤ects of
competition on health inequalities would be similar in a model with more than one condition as long as the price
di¤erences across conditions remain constant.
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whether a price increase induces quality convergence or quality dispersion. The last two terms
capture the e¤ects of changes in patient composition as a result of the price increase, and the sum
of these (second-order) e¤ects is a priori indeterminate.
If the marginal benet of quality is decreasing at a su¢ ciently low rate, the direction of the
patient composition e¤ect (i.e., the second and third terms in (29)) is uniquely determined by
whether or not competition leads to quality dispersion. To see this, consider the extreme case of
linear health benets, which implies @Bk=@q1 = @Bk=@q2 = @Bk=@q. The expression in (29) can
then be rewritten as
@
@p
=  1
2
2X
i=1

@Bh
@q
  @B
l
@q

@qi
@p
  1
t

Bh (q1) Bh (q2)
 @Bh
@q
 

Bl (q1) Bl (q2)
 @Bl
@q

@
@p
:
(30)
By the assumption @Bh=@q > @Bl=@q, the expression in square brackets is positive. This implies
that, if competition leads to quality dispersion, i.e., if @=@p > 0, the rst- and second-order
e¤ects go in the same direction, and a higher price always leads to less health inequality (on
average) between high- and low-severity patients. Thus, in the case of @=@p > 0, the rst-
order e¤ect is reinforced by the following second-order e¤ect: Since a higher price increases quality
dispersion between the hospitals, and since high-severity patients are more responsive than low-
severity patients to changes in quality dispersion, the share of high-severity patients in the high-
quality hospital will increase, which further reduces the health inequality between these two groups
of patients. This illustrates how increased disparities in quality across hospitals do not necessarily
imply increased disparities in health outcomes across patient types. In the above example, the
opposite holds. Since it is the most disadvantaged group, i.e., the high-severity patients, who
benet most from di¤erences in qualities across hospitals, health inequalities are actually reduced.
Increased patient choice The e¤ect of an increase in patient choice is given by
@
@r
=  1
2
2X
i=1

@Bh
@qi
  @B
l
@qi

@qi
@r
  1
t

Bh (q1) Bh (q2)
@Bh
@q1
@q1
@r
  @B
h
@q2
@q2
@r

+
1
t

Bl (q1) Bl (q2)
@Bl
@q1
@q1
@r
  @B
l
@q2
@q2
@r

(31)
  1
2t2

Bh (q1) Bh (q2)
2   Bl (q1) Bl (q2)2 :
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The rst three terms are completely equivalent to the previously explained e¤ects of a price increase.
However, a change in patient choice also has an additional e¤ect, given by the last term in (31).
As previously explained, an increase in patient choice makes demand more sensitive to quality
di¤erences, which implies that a relatively larger share of high-severity patients will choose the
high-quality hospital. All else equal, this extra e¤ect contributes in the direction of competition
leading to less inequality in health outcomes between high- and low-severity patients.
Whether we consider an increase in price or in patient choice, notice that the e¤ect via changes
in quality di¤erences, represented by the second and third terms in (29) and (31), respectively, is
identical in both cases. If the marginal health benet of quality is constant, the sum of these two
terms are negative, thereby contributing to lower health inequality, if competition leads to quality
dispersion. The reason, as previously explained, is that it is the most disadvantaged patient group
who benets more from quality dispersion. By continuity, this holds also for health benet functions
with a su¢ ciently low degree of concavity, which allows us to summarise the above derived results
as follows:
Proposition 4 (i) An increase in competition (whether by a higher price or by increased patient
choice) reduces inequalities across patients with di¤erent severity if the subsequent changes in patient
composition at each hospital are su¢ ciently small. (ii) If the marginal health gain from quality is
constant or decreases slowly with quality, a su¢ cient condition for increased competition to reduce
inequalities across severity types is that competition leads to quality dispersion.
When seeing Proposition 4 in conjunction with Propositions 1 and 2, we can further pin down
the cases in which competition reduces health inequalities across severity types:
Corollary 1 Suppose that A1-A3 hold, and suppose that the marginal health gain from quality is
constant or decreases slowly with quality. In this case, a price increase will always reduce inequality
between patient types, whereas increased patient choice will reduce inequality if the e¤ect of quality
on marginal treatment cost is su¢ ciently small.
The following Table 2 summarises and illustrate some insights that can be drawn from the
model. It shows that (i) changes in inequalities in quality across hospitals go hand-in-hand with
changes in health inequalities if the health benet function is not too concave, (ii) health inequalities
across di¤erent severity levels reduce if composition e¤ects are small, and (iii) health inequalities
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due to postcode lottery can go in the opposite direction of health inequalities between high- and
low-severity patients. The latter is exemplied by the case of linear health gain and competition
inducing quality dispersion. As a result, while health inequalities due to postcode lottery are
increased, health inequalities between high- and low-severity patients are reduced.
Table 2. The e¤ect of competition on health inequalities
Health gain Quality Health inequalities Health inequalities between
di¤erence due to postcode lottery high- and low-severity patients
Linear No e¤ect Unchanged Reduced
Linear Dispersion Increased Reduced
Linear Convergence Reduced Reduced**
Concave No e¤ect Reduced Reduced**
Concave Dispersion Increased* Reduced**
Concave Convergence Reduced Reduced**
*If the health benet function is not too concave. **If composition e¤ects are su¢ ciently small.
4.3 Aggregate measures of (absolute and relative) health inequality
In the previous subsections we have studied the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities along two
di¤erent dimensions: (i) inequalities between patients treated at di¤erent hospitals (arising from
the postcode lottery) and (ii) inequalities between high- and low-severity patients. An aggregate
measure of inequality which allows to trade o¤ inequalities along di¤erent dimensions is the Gini
coe¢ cient, which is also a function of the share of (high/low severity) patients who receive high
and low quality. To illustrate the role of the latter we start with a simplied framework with only
one severity level, and then extend to two severity levels.
4.3.1 One severity level
With only one severity level, there are only two patient groups, those receiving high quality (at
Hospital 1) and those receiving low quality (at Hospital 2). Using the notational short-hand Bi :=
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B (qi ), the Lorenz curve is given by
L (x) =
8><>:
B2
B
x if 0  x  1 D1
  (B1 B2)(1 D1)
B
+ B1
B
x if 1 D1 < x  1
; (32)
where B := D1B1 + (1 D1)B2 is average health outcome. The Gini coe¢ cient is then given by
G = 1  2
Z 1
0
L (x) dx = 1  [B1   (B1  B2) (1 D1) (1 +D1)]
B
; (33)
where
@G
@B1
=
(1 D1)D1B2
B
2 > 0; (34)
@G
@B2
=  (1 D1)D1B1
B
2 < 0 (35)
and
@G
@D1
=   (B1  B2) B2 (2D1   1) +D
2
1 (B1  B2)
B
2 < 0: (36)
All else equal, a marginal increase in the health outcome of patients at the high-quality (low-quality)
hospital will increase (reduce) the Gini coe¢ cient. Furthermore, an increase in the market share
of the high-quality hospital which initially has the larger market share will reduce the Gini
coe¢ cient. Notice also that
@G
@B1
+
@G
@B2
=  (1 D1)D1
B
2 (B1  B2) < 0: (37)
Thus, a marginal increase in health outcome for all patients will, all else equal, reduce the Gini
coe¢ cient. This is a reection of the Gini coe¢ cient being a relative measure of inequality, which
is reduced when all patients experience an equal absolute increase in health status.
We can convert the Gini coe¢ cient to a measure of absolute inequality by multiplying G with
the average health outcome, which yields the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient:
eG := B (q1; q2)G = D1 (1 D1) (B1  B2) ; (38)
where
@ eG
@B1
=   @
eG
@B2
= D1 (1 D1) > 0 (39)
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and
@ eG
@D1
=   (B1  B2) (2D1   1) < 0: (40)
As for the Gini coe¢ cient, a higher market share for the high-quality hospital will also reduce
absolute inequality, whereas a marginal improvement in the health status of patients at the high-
quality (low-quality) hospital will increase (reduce) absolute inequality, as measured by the Gener-
alised Gini coe¢ cient. However, for given patient allocations between the two hospitals, an equal
absolute increase in the health status of all patients has no e¤ect on absolute inequality (i.e.,
@ eG=@B1 + @ eG=@B2 = 0).
Higher treatment price The e¤ect of a higher treatment price on absolute inequality, as given
by the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient, is given by
@ eG
@p
= D1 (1 D1)

@B1
@p
  @B2
@p

  (B1  B2) (2D1   1) @D1
@p
; (41)
which can be re-written as
@ eG
@p
=

D1 (1 D1)  1
2t
(2D1   1) (B1  B2)

@

@p
; (42)
where 
 := B1  B2, and where @
=@p is given by (24).
A price increase a¤ects absolute inequality only if it a¤ects inequality due to the postcode
lottery (given by @
=@p). Suppose that a higher price leads to increased inequality between the
hospitals (@
=@p > 0), which implies a reallocation of patients towards the high-quality hospital
(@D1=@p > 0). This has two counteracting e¤ects on the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient, given by the
two terms in square brackets on the right-hand side of (42). One the one hand, for given market
shares, absolute inequality increases because of increased inequality in health outcomes. However,
the reallocation of patients towards the high-quality hospital implies that a lower share of patients
experience low quality, which reduces the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient.
The relative strength of these two e¤ects depends on the initial quality di¤erence. If the quality
di¤erence is small, so that D1 is close to 12 and B1 close to B2, then the rst e¤ect dominates and
a dispersion in health outcomes increases absolute inequality. On the other hand, if the quality
di¤erence is very large, so that D1 is close to 1, the second e¤ect dominates and further dispersion
in health outcomes actually reduces absolute inequality.
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The e¤ect of a higher treatment price on relative inequality can be expressed as
@G
@p
=
1
B
2

(1 D1)D1B2   1
2t
(B1  B2)
 
B2 (2D1   1) +D21 (B1  B2)
 @

@p
 (1 D1)D1B1
B
2
@B2
@q2
@q2
@p
: (43)
The rst term in (43) is completely equivalent to (42) and contains the two counteracting e¤ects
described above. The second term, which is negative, is specic to the Gini coe¢ cient and reects
the fact that G measures relative inequality. Even if @
=@p = 0, a higher price leads to a reduction
in G. This is a pure level e¤ect. Even if a price increase does not lead to any patient reallocations,
the resulting higher quality at both hospitals reduces the relative health inequality between the
two patient groups.
Increased patient choice The e¤ects of increased patient choice on absolute and relative in-
equality, respectively, are given by
@ eG
@r
=

D1 (1 D1)  1
2t
(2D1   1) (B1  B2)

@

@r
  (B1  B2)
2 (2D1   1)
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=
1
B
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
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 
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 (1 D1)D1B1
B
2
@B2
@q2
@q2
@r
  (B1  B2)2 B2 (2D1   1) +D
2
1 (B1  B2)
2t2B
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Comparing (44)-(45) with (42)-(43), we see that the e¤ects are similar to the e¤ects of a price
increase, but with one additional sub-e¤ect, represented by the last term in (44) and in (45). For
given quality levels, increased patient choice implies a reallocation of patients towards the high-
quality hospital. This e¤ect contributes to lower relative and absolute inequality. Thus, if a price
increase and an increase in patient choice have the exact same e¤ect on quality at both hospitals,
the scope for a subsequent reduction in (absolute and relative) inequality is larger in the case of
increased patient choice.
We summarise the above analysis as follows:
Proposition 5 Suppose that all patients have the same severity level.
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(i) If competition leads to a dispersion (convergence) of health outcomes between the two hos-
pitals, this will, all else equal, contribute towards an increase (reduction) in absolute and relative
inequality if the initial quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently small, and towards a reduction (increase) in
absolute and relative inequality if the initial quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently large.
(ii) If the di¤erence in health outcomes is una¤ected by the degree of competition, a price increase
has no e¤ect on absolute inequality but reduces relative inequality, whereas an increase in patient
choice reduces both absolute and relative inequality.
4.3.2 Two severity levels
The previous analysis with one severity level can be seen as an approximation of the case where
severity di¤erences are small relative to quality di¤erences between the hospitals, such that a patient
treated at the high-quality hospital always has a better health outcome than a patient treated at
the low-quality hospital, regardless of severity.
Consider now the opposite, that severity di¤erences are large relative to quality di¤erences, in
the sense that the health outcome is always better for a low-severity patient than for a high-severity
patient, regardless of which hospital the patient is treated at. Thus, and using again the notational
short-hand Bki := B
k (qi ), suppose that B
l
1 > B
l
2 > B
h
1 > B
h
2 . In this case, the Lorenz curve is
given by
L (x) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
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B
x if 0  x   Dh1
 (B
h
1 Bh2 )x1
B
+
Bh1
B
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 (B
h
1 Bh2 )x1+(Bl2 Bh1 )x2
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+
Bl2
B
x if  < x  1 Dl1
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1 Bh2 )x1+(Bl2 Bh1 )x2+(Bl1 Bl2)x3
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where B :=
 
 Dh1

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h
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l
1 is average health outcome. The Gini
coe¢ cient is given by
G = 1  1
B
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while the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient is given by
eG = Dl1 1 Dl1Bl1  Bl2+Dh1 2  1 Dh1Bh1  Bh2+  (1  )Bl2  Bh2 : (48)
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Competition can a¤ect absolute and relative inequality along three main dimensions:
1. Competition can a¤ect inequalities due to the postcode lottery. For given patient allocations,
this e¤ect is described in Proposition 3.
2. Competition can a¤ect inequalities between high- and low-severity patients. This e¤ect is
described in Proposition 4.
3. Competition can a¤ect the relative shares of di¤erent patient groups, as highlighted by the
analysis in the previous subsection, which is summarised in Proposition 5.
For the case of one severity level, the e¤ects along the third dimension listed above are straight-
forward. If competition leads to patient reallocation towards the high-quality (low-quality) hospital,
this will all else equal contribute to lower (higher) inequality. For the case of two severity types,
which implies four di¤erent patient groups, the e¤ects along this dimension are somewhat more
complicated. To illustrate this, consider the e¤ect on absolute inequality of patient reallocation
towards the high-quality hospital. From (48) we derive
@ eG
@Dh1
=  

Bh1  Bh2

2

Dh1   

+ 1

< 0:
and
@ eG
@Dl1
=

Bl1  Bl2

1  2Dl1

< (>) 0 if Dl1 > (<)
1
2
:
A reallocation of high-severity patients towards the high-quality hospital implies a reallocation
of patients from the group with the worst health outcome to the group with the second-worst
outcome. This will always reduce inequality. However, a reallocation of low-severity patients
towards the high-quality hospital, which implies a reallocation of patients from the group with
the second-best health outcome to the group with the best health outcome, will reduce inequality
only if the latter group constitutes more than half of all patients, which requires that the share of
high-severity patients () is very low.
The e¤ects of increased competition on absolute and relative inequality are analytically given by
some very involved expressions that yield limited additional insights. It is therefore more illustrative
to display the e¤ects by numerical simulations based on our previous parameterisations. Table
3 shows the e¤ects of increased competition (higher price or increased patient choice) based on
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the parameterisations in Example 1, with a quadratic health benet function.6 We consider two
di¤erent cases:  = 12 and  = 1. The latter case implies only one severity level and therefore
removes e¤ects related to inequalities between high- and low-severity patients.
Table 3: Quadratic health function and constant marginal treatment costs (Example 1)
 = 12  = 1
 
h 
l  G eG  
 G eG
p = 12 0:167 0:319 0:153 0:877 0:150 0:247 0:222 0:420 0:067 0:086
p = 1 0:133 0:236 0:102 0:744 0:112 0:206 0:178 0:300 0:042 0:068
p = 2 0:091 0:141 0:050 0:537 0:070 0:146 0:121 0:169 0:020 0:041
t = 2 0:078 0:147 0:068 0:868 0:137 0:230 0:105 0:191 0:036 0:047
t = 1 0:133 0:236 0:102 0:744 0:112 0:206 0:178 0:300 0:042 0:068
t = 12 0:200 0:320 0:120 0:512 0:071 0:147 0:267 0:391 0:018 0:038
Remaining parameter values: c1 = 0, c2 = 12 , h = l =  = 1, k = h = l = 2:
In the example shown in Table 3, a higher price leads to quality convergence whereas increased
patient choice leads to quality dispersion. Despite decreasing marginal health gains, quality dis-
persion (convergence) also implies dispersion (convergence) in health outcomes for each severity
type.
Consider rst the case of  = 1. The e¤ect of competition on absolute inequality (as measured
by eG) is then determined by changes in inequality along two di¤erent dimensions. On the one
hand, higher (lower) inequalities due to the postcode lottery contributes to higher (lower) absolute
inequality, whereas, on the other hand, increased (reduced) market share of the high-quality hospital
contributes to lower (higher) absolute inequality. These two e¤ects are always counteracting, as
discussed in the previous sub-section. For the case of a price increase, the former e¤ect dominates.
The reduction in postcode inequality is su¢ ciently strong to reduce the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient.
However, for the case of increased patient choice, the overall e¤ect is non-monotonic. Absolute
inequality increases as t is reduced from 2 to 1, but decreases as t reduced from 1 to 12 . This
6Analytical expressions for the Nash equilibrium, on which these numerical examples are based, are given in the
Appendix.
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illustrates the rst part of Proposition 6, which states that dispersion in health outcomes contributes
towards more (less) inequality if the initial quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently small (large).
The e¤ects of competition on relative inequality (as measured by G) are qualitatively identical
to the e¤ect on absolute quality, even if the former measure is sensitive to a level e¤ect, whereby
higher quality in itself reduces relative inequality. However, this e¤ect is not strong enough to
prevent an increase in the Gini coe¢ cient when t is reduced from 2 to 1.
Consider now the case of  = 12 . The e¤ect of competition on absolute and relative inequality
is now determined also by changes in inequalities along a third dimension, namely inequalities
between high- and low-severity types, as measured by . We see that competition always reduces
inequality along this dimension, regardless of whether competition leads to quality convergence or
quality dispersion. The reason is that high-severity patients benet more from higher quality than
low-severity patients. The reduction of inequality along this dimension implies that increased com-
petition always reduces both absolute and relative inequality for all the numerical values considered
in this example.
In Table 4 we show an equivalent numerical analysis based on the parameterisation in Example
2.
Table 4: Linear health function and quality-dependent treatment costs (Example 2)
 = 12  = 1
 
h 
l  G eG  
 G eG
p = 12 0:087 0:174 0:087 0:879 0:141 0:236 0:092 0:183 0:033 0:044
p = 1 0:106 0:212 0:106 0:703 0:101 0:195 0:122 0:244 0:032 0:057
p = 2 0:144 0:289 0:144 0:347 0:046 0:112 0:183 0:366 0:029 0:079
t = 2 0:093 0:185 0:093 0:882 0:142 0:238 0:095 0:191 0:035 0:047
t = 1 0:106 0:212 0:106 0:703 0:101 0:195 0:122 0:244 0:032 0:057
t = 12 0:164 0:328 0:164 0:338 0:043 0:105 0:213 0:426 0:011 0:029
Parameter values: c1 = 0:1, c2 = 0:5, h = l = 1, k = h = l = 2:
In the numerical examples shown in Table 4, more competition (either by a higher price or by
increased patient choice) always leads to quality dispersion. Because of the linearity of the health
30
benet function, this also implies that competition leads to increased postcode inequality. The
implications for absolute and relative inequality are very similar to those shown in Table 3, though.
The only di¤erence is that, for the case of  = 1, the level e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong to ensure
that more competition leads to a monotonic reduction in relative inequality, even if the postcode
inequality increases.
For the case of  = 12 , more competition always leads to a reduction in both absolute and
relative inequality. As for the examples shown in Table 3, the driving force is the reduction in
inequality between high- and low-severity patients. The strong negative e¤ect of competition on
inequality along this dimension, for di¤erent parameterisations and di¤erent numerical parameter
values, suggests that this is a fairly general result. Furthermore, our numerical simulations suggest
that competition will lead to a reduction in both absolute and relative inequality for a wide range of
parameters. In fact, for the two di¤erent parameterisations explored here, it is hard to nd examples
of the opposite as long as the shares of high- and low-severity patients are not too uneven.
5 Implications for empirical analyses
In this section we discuss possible approaches which could be pursued to test empirically how com-
petition a¤ects health inequalities. First, to test for the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities
due to postcode lottery, researchers could compute measures of dispersion of health outcomes, such
as the standard deviation or the coe¢ cient of variation, within a given hospital catchment area and
relate them to the degree of patient choice and market structure. For example, future empirical
work could test whether in more competitive areas the introduction of patient choice policies lead
to an increase or a reduction in AMI mortality dispersion across hospitals.
Second, to test for the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities a sub-group analysis by degree
of severity may be appropriate. In line with Geppert and Kessler (2005), high severity could be
measured based on the number of previous hospital admissions preceding a health shock (such as
AMI). By comparing the e¤ect of competition on mortality for high- and low-severity patients, we
can infer the e¤ect on health inequalities across severity groups.
Third, the two types of inequality could be brought together by developing a Generalised Gini
or Gini index in a given market area, where patients are ordered by their level of health, i.e.,
starting with patients with highest severity and lowest hospital quality and ending with patients
with lowest severity and highest quality.
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Our analysis also illustrates the importance of patient composition e¤ectswhen measuring
the e¤ect of competition due to patients with high and low severity exercising choice to a di¤erent
degree. Competition a¤ects di¤erentially the health gains for patients with di¤ering severity but
also changes the number of patients receiving high and low quality through the composition e¤ect.
These will a¤ect both the Gini coe¢ cients and the simple measures of dispersion of health outcomes
across hospitals.
The empirical literature which estimates patient choice models as a function of quality and
severity tends to conrm that high-severity patients are more likely to choose high-quality hospitals.
The elasticity of hospital demand to quality are however generally low and so are the interactions
between quality and severity (see Brekke et al., 2014, Section 3.1, for a review of the evidence). We
therefore conjecture that overall composition e¤ects are likely to be small in empirical analyses.
Finally, our analysis highlights the importance of distinguishing empirically between quality
and health outcomes. Although health outcomes are often used as a proxy of hospital quality, our
study highlights how inequalities in qualities do not necessarily go hand-in-hand with inequalities
in health outcomes. In relation to inequalities due to postcode lottery, an increase in inequalities
in quality across hospitals is compatible with a reduction in health inequalities across hospitals if
the marginal health gain is decreasing, so that patients in high-quality hospitals benet less from
a given quality increase than do patients in low-quality hospitals. Similarly, an increase in quality
di¤erences across hospitals is compatible with a reduction in health inequalities across severity
types and this is due to patients with higher severity beneting more from the increase in quality
compared to patients with lower severity.
6 Concluding remarks
Several OECD countries have introduced pro-market policy interventions in the health sector with
the aim of stimulating quality of care. Such policies are generally contentious and the subject of an
intense political debate. The existing literature has extensively investigated, both theoretically and
empirically, the e¤ect of competition on quality but there is very little work on its impact on equity.
This is surprising given that reduction in health inequalities is an ubiquitous policy objective. Our
study has contributed to ll this gap in knowledge by carefully characterising the conditions under
which competition (i) increases or reduces the gap between high-quality and low-quality hospitals
(due to postcode lottery), and, as a result, (ii) contributes to an increase or reduction in health
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inequalities.
Our rst key nding is that the e¤ect of competition on hospital quality gap depends on demand
and supply factors a¤ecting health care provision, more precisely captured by (i) the marginal health
gains from quality a demand parameter and (ii) the extent to which quality a¤ects marginal
treatment costs a supply parameter. Our most clear-cut result is that competition, regardless of
how it is measured, is more likely to lead to quality convergence across hospitals if marginal health
gains decrease with quality at a faster rate. The answer also depends, to some extent, on how we
measure competition, whether by an increase in the xed price or by an increase in the degree of
patient choice. Cost factors increase the scope for quality dispersion when competition is measured
by an increase in price, but not necessarily when measured by patient choice. Such factors will
vary by medical condition, diagnosis and treatment. For example, standardised treatments such
as cataract surgery will have treatment costs mildly increasing with quality. This may not be the
case for more serious treatments, such as a coronary bypass, where costs will increase more rapidly
with quality.
Our second key nding is that health inequalities due to postcode lottery go hand in hand with
health inequalities but only if health gains are not too concave in quality. Instead, we nd that
competition generally reduces health inequalities across patients with di¤erent severity, because
high-severity patients benet more from higher quality than do low-severity patients. This reduction
can be strengthened or weakened by what we refer to as composition e¤ects, which relate to
competition inducing more high-severity patients to exercise choice and to select hospitals with
higher quality. Reductions in inequalities across severity types also drive reductions in the Gini
and Generalised Gini coe¢ cients, which aggregate di¤erent sources of health inequalities both
across hospitals and severity types.
Finally, we highlight that measuring the e¤ect of competition on health inequalities through
simple measures of dispersion or through the Gini coe¢ cient is important since di¤erent measures
can lead to di¤erent conclusions. If competition increases di¤erences in health outcomes across
hospitals, the Generalised Gini coe¢ cient may still reduce due to the composition e¤ects, and the
Gini coe¢ cient will reduce further as a result of the overall increase in quality.
In terms of policy implications, our analysis highlights that whether competition induces an
equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ depends on the particular dimension of equity which policy makers focus
on. For example, if policy makers focus on equity due to postcode lottery, then an equity-e¢ ciency
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trade-o¤ may arise though it is less likely to be the case when demand parameters are more
important. An equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ is instead unlikely when considering equity across severity
types if more severe patients tend to benet more than low-severity ones from increases in quality.
Our study provides a theoretical framework to guide future empirical work. Future empirical
studies should focus not only on testing the e¤ect of competition on quality, but also its equity
implications. This can be done, as discussed in Section 5, by developing measures of dispersions in
quality and health outcomes within a given hospital catchment or market area, and then by relating
these to changes in patient choice and in prices through consolidated econometric strategies.
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Appendix
Second-order and stability conditions
The second-order conditions of the hospitalsprot-maximising problem are given by
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The Nash equilibrium is stable if
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Comparative statics
The e¤ects of a marginal price change on equilibrium qualities are given by
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The e¤ects of a marginal change in transportation costs on equilibrium qualities are given by
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By applying the rst-order conditions, (6), we can simplify and rewrite (A12)-(A13) as
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which implies that @q1=@r > 0 and @q2=@r > 0.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Notice rst that assumptions A2 and A3 imply c1 = c2 and @2C=@q21 =
@2C=@q22. (i) Since both  2 and  1 go to zero as @c
k
i =@qi goes to zero, while p1  p2 (by assumption
A1) and B1 > B2, for any value of @cki =@qi, as long as B
k () is strictly concave, the statement in
the rst part of the Proposition is true by monotonicity. (ii) Suppose that @2Bk=@q2i ! 0, which
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implies B1 ! B2 and p1 ! p2. It follows from (16) that @=@p > 0 if  2 >  1, which is true for
@ck1=@q1 < @c
k
2=@q2. By continuity, this result also holds for a su¢ ciently low degree of concavity
of Bk (). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Notice rst that assumptions A2 and A3 imply c1 = c2 and
@2C=@q21 = @
2C=@q22. Suppose that @c
k
i =@qi ! 0, which implies  1 ! 0 and  2 ! 0. Fur-
thermore, suppose @2Bk=@q2i ! 0, which implies B1 ! B2 and p1 ! p2. It follows from (21) that
@=@r > 0 if 1 > 2, which, from (19)-(20), is true if @C=@q1 > @C=@q2. Because of the convexity
of C, this condition holds for all q1 > q2. By continuity, this result also holds for su¢ ciently low
values of @cki =@qi and for a su¢ ciently low degree of concavity of B
k (). Q.E.D.
Equilibrium qualities in Tables 3 and 4
The numerical examples in Table 3 are based on a health benet function given by
Bk (qi) = k + kqi  

2
q2i ; k = l; h; (A16)
along with the cost functions given in Example 1. The resulting Nash equilibrium is given by
q1 =
 (p  c1)
 (p  c1) + 2kt ; (A17)
q2 =
 (p  c2)
 (p  c2) + 2kt ; (A18)
where  := h + (1  )l.
The numerical examples in Table 4 are based on a health benet function given by (A16) with
 = 0, along with the cost functions given in Example 2. The resulting Nash equilibrium is given
by
q1 =
 (p ( (c1 + 2c2) + 2kt)  3tc1c2)  2kt2c1
 (4kt (c1 + c2) + 3c1c2) + 4k2t2
; (A19)
q2 =
 (p ( (2c1 + c2) + 2kt)  3tc1c2)  2kt2c2
 (4kt (c1 + c2) + 3c1c2) + 4k2t2
: (A20)
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